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ABSTRACT 
 
Political Embeddedness, Executive Autonomy, Corporate Characteristics, and Financial 
Malfeasance in Large Telecommunications Companies. (December 2011) 
Bryce Hannibal, B.S., Brigham Young University-Idaho 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Harland Prechel 
 
 This thesis examines the causes of financial malfeasance in the largest U.S. 
telecommunications corporations between 1995 and 2004.  Specifically, it examines 
whether or not the executive compensation package influences the likelihood that a 
corporation will falsify its financial statements.  The methods used are both qualitative 
and quantitative.  I approach the question form a historical point of view and attempt to 
identify certain salient characteristics within the telecommunications industry that may 
influence of unethical or illegal activity.   The findings support organizational-political 
embeddedness theory, which suggests that differential social structures create 
dependencies, incentives, and opportunities to engage in financial malfeasance. The 
historical analysis shows that neoliberal policies enacted in the mid-1990s resulted in 
organizational and political structures that permitted managers to engage in financial 
malfeasance while limiting the efficiency of regulatory bureaucracies.  The quantitative 
analysis yields mixed findings, many of which are consistent with previous research on 
white-collar crime and financial malfeasance.  This thesis adds to existing literature by 
outlining significant public policy shifts and the results those shifts may have on specific 
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industries.  These findings have important implications for political officials and 
corporate oversight organizations.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The twenty-first century began with a series of financial collapses of large 
corporations within various industries; Enron lead the way followed by WorldCom, 
Adelphia, and Tyco.  Political officials, corporate managers, and popular media have 
attributed, and continue to attribute, the origin of the collapse to individual 
characteristics such as greed and envy, instead of explaining why investors were 
unaware of executive financial decisions (Prechel and Morris 2010).  While individuals’ 
unsavory ideals and morals may be partially responsible for any economic crisis and 
recession (Hooks et al. 1994; Mitchell et al. 1996; Stavros 1998), stating that the cause 
of a phenomenon of such magnitude is a consequence of the actions of a few individuals 
is an insufficient explanation at best.  Other observers claim that the diminishing profits 
of stock holders and the lost retirement funds of employees were largely a result of lack 
of financial transparency and irresponsibility of executive managers (Hooks et al. 1994; 
Russell and Finnerman 1995; Holmes et al. 2002; Harris and Bromiley 2007).   
Studies of white-collar crime and corporate malfeasance suggest that 
organizational characteristics, company size, enforcement strategies, budget restrictions, 
and economic conditions affect organizational deviance and corporate crime (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Clinard and Yeager 1980; Simpson 1986; Leatherwood and Spector 
1991; Tillman and Pontell 1995).  Prechel and Morris (2010: 350) recently showed that 
differential corporate structure (i.e., the multilayer-subsidiary form) enables corporate 
 
This thesis follows the style of American Sociological Review. 
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Managers to “engage in and conceal financial malfeasance.”  Understanding the causes 
of white-collar crime is needed in order to protect the investing public and to ensure 
capital growth and stability (Fama and Jensen 1983).  I suggest that the combined 
influences of differential social structures, political embeddedness and corporate 
characteristics are important factors in the study of corporate malfeasance.  To examine 
if this is the case I focus my research on telecommunications companies, in the period 
following the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
With the expansion of the internet and World Wide Web, corporate executives in 
the telecommunications industry acknowledged the profit-making opportunities 
associated with expansion in this industrial sector.  However, regulatory policies limited 
the capacity of corporations to realize such goals.   
Advocates of deregulation maintained that telecommunications needed to be 
“unshackled so that the United States could properly enter the information age” (Horwitz 
1989: vii).  In response, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was enacted to establish 
“the terms for competition within local telephony, for a range of telecommunications 
services, for competitive video services provision, and for expansion of broadcast 
service” (Aufderheide 1999: 61)   
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2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Previous studies on executive compensation and forms of corporate malfeasance 
have focused on behavioral and agency theories as well as individual characteristics to 
explain executive action (Schnatterly 2003; Harris and Bromiley 2007; Simon 2008).  
However, organizational sociologists have suggested that studies on the individual have 
not resulted reliable and accurate conclusions because individual and corporate actions 
are constrained through capital dependencies (Mizruchi and Stearns 1994), other 
resource dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) and corporate structures (Prechel and 
Morris 2010).  Understanding and analyzing individual morals and values, therefore, 
cannot sufficiently explain individual or corporate action.     
Schnatterly (2003: 588) states that the research conducted on organizational 
malfeasance is insufficient and there is a need to more thoroughly link corporate 
malfeasance research to organizational theory.  Therefore, the conceptual framework I 
will use draws from organization-political embeddedness theory, which (1) “identifies 
historical conditions that structure corporate actors’ motives and actions, and (2) 
maintains that corporate-state relations cannot be separated from one another in modern 
society because state policies give form to corporate structure” (Prechel and Morris 
2010: 332).  I employ this framework to examine the following research question: How 
do organizational characteristics, including corporate structures, financial performance, 
and executive compensation, affect a corporation’s likelihood of involvement in 
financial malfeasance?  
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This study is important because it also tests widely accepted explanations in the 
field of economic sociology.  Jenson and Murphy (1990) imply that incentives offered to 
a chief executive officer (CEO) may be unimportant to production and market 
performance.  Others suggest that because executives may have inside knowledge to 
shifting market values they will undoubtedly act strategically and opportunistically 
(Boyer 2010), even if the strategies used to do so are illegal or unethical.  Boyer (2010) 
further states that executives are able to maximize individual profit through casual use of 
insider information; the use of such information is illegal when used for personal gains 
at the expense of other investors. 
2.1 Organizational and Political Embeddedness 
In the 1980s a revival of the use of comparative historical sociological methods 
raised questions about theoretical explanations which ignore historical variation and 
disregard historical breaks and changes.  Ahistorical sociological research and analysis 
causes a separation of theory and history.  This separation yields invalid discovery 
because such research “denies or masks important features of historical reality” (Isaac 
and Griffin 1989: 873).  Following this theoretical logic, organizational-political 
embeddedness theory posits that historical conditions affect an executive’s decisions and 
actions (Prechel and Morris 2010).  Studying historical variation is important because 
economic and state regulations vary over time.  Corporate actors are enabled or 
constrained by events and circumstances internal and external to their companies.   
As explained below, organizational-political embeddedness theory further 
maintains that differential social structures create dependencies, incentives, and 
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opportunities to engage in financial malfeasance.  This theory suggests that forms of 
executive compensation (i.e., stock holdings or stock options) create incentives to falsely 
represent the companies’ financial data to increase executive financial gains.     
2.2 Dependencies 
 Organizational structure theories maintain that corporations become resource 
dependent, meaning that much of an organization’s actions occur in response to the 
world or other organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), when externally constrained or 
controlled (Prechel and Morris 2010).  Resource dependency encourages corporations to 
enhance autonomy and pursue self-interests.  A company’s market and regulatory 
environments, and its resource dependencies promote competition and create uncertainty 
that constrains corporate action and threatens a corporation’s survival (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003; Boyer 2010).  Capital dependencies, or borrowed monies (Mizruchi and 
Stearns 1994), affect how a corporation manages its finances and creates incentives to 
change its organization and structure (Greve 1998; Prechel and Morris 2010).  To 
illustrate, during the 1980s corporations changed from a multi-divisional form to a 
multilayer-subsidiary form due to capital dependence and tax benefits (Prechel and 
Boies 1998; Boyer 2010).  A multi-divisional form is one company structured as various 
sections based on areas of focus.  The multilayer-subsidiary form is made up of legally 
independent companies nested under a holding or parent company.  The parent company 
owns majority of the stock of the subsidiaries and acts as a financier to them. 
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2.3 Incentives 
Economist and other social scientists have disputed the effectiveness of various 
executive incentive structures for decades.  A topic of debate is the commonly accepted 
pay-for-performance plan.  The plan implies that individual behaviors resulting in 
awards or other incentives tend to be repeated (Hamner 1975).  Behavioral scientists 
have long supported this principle, as it has been adhered to by large corporations and 
small businesses who have implemented an executive pay-for-performance or merit pay 
system (Jensen and Murphy 1990).   
Research on executive incentives typically falls into two categories: bonuses and 
stock awards (Harris and Bromiley 2007).  Bonuses are past incentives and serve only as 
a proxy indicating what an executive might earn in the future.  Stock awards, on the 
other hand, are future incentives that can be monitored and, because of insider 
knowledge, partially predicted by an executive. By the late 1990s, compensation in stock 
options was widely practiced.  In 1997, 71.8 percent of firms gave some kind of stock 
offering as a part of their executive compensation package (Monks and Minow 2004).  
According to March and Simon (1993) when monetary rewards are dependent on 
performance, the consequences of increasing production are more favorable.  Well 
established incentive ties will influence managerial actions and decisions.  When 
executives are compensated in or awarded stock options, they share corporate profit and 
goals with the shareholders.  This compensation creates incentives for managers to act 
more like owners and implement strategies for long-term increase in shareholder value.  
Boyer (2010) stated that “[aligning] the interests of shareholders and managers” was the 
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motto of the 1990s.  Much of the increase in stock-options payment was due to the “new 
economy” start-up companies who offered modest salaries with a significant number of 
stock options.  This tactic allowed companies to keep production costs low and show 
higher profits because stock options were not required to be included in company costs 
(Boyer 2010).    
2.4 Information Asymmetries and Opportunist Behavior 
Economic sociological theory states that a realistic description of market action 
assumes that market actors are subject to bounded rationality and market opportunism 
(Baker 1984).  Bounded rationality assumes that human cognitive ability is limited by a 
person’s ability to make decisions under conditions of complexity and uncertainty. This 
limitation occurs when (1) individual actors are not able to comprehend the complexity 
of various situations or the business environment in general (Williamson 1975) or (2) 
information necessary to make prudent financial decisions (such as, amount of debt) has 
been purposely withheld by corporate individuals.   
Investors are entitled, however, to sufficient financial data prior to investing.  
Consequently, corporations are required to divulge financial information that accurately 
represents a company’s financial standing.  In the mid-1990s corporate managers 
reported inaccurate financial information to regulatory bureaucracies.  Consequently, 
investors made important financial decisions as if the information were accurate and 
fully disclosed (Malik 2003).  Their exposure to risky financial situations defined by 
uninformed decisions resulted in financial losses.   
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 Organizational-political embeddedness theory likewise posits that varying 
historical conditions create incentives for executives to act opportunistically and not 
divulge sufficient financial information to the investing public.  Acting opportunistically 
is described as self-interested action that is not trustworthy in pursuit of financial profit 
(Williamson 1975).  A market opportunist will “take advantage of others, provide false 
or misleading information, break agreements, and so forth” (Baker 1984: 778).  The 
combination of market opportunism paired with information asymmetries and 
uncertainty are especially critical in creating a vulnerable marketplace for investors.  
These conditions pose, however, little financial risk for an opportunist executive 
(Williamson 1975).  The opportunistic executive may exploit any level of investor risk 
to further his/her individual motives.   
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3. CASE STUDY AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
3.1 The Telecommunications Industry 
 Telecommunications has undergone substantial innovation, expansion, and 
change since the end of the First World War.  Prior to 1921, in a time known as the era 
of competition, consumers saw increasing utility prices for low quality products and 
service.  Small locally driven telecommunications companies emerged in competition 
with Bell Telephone Company (Bell).  However, because Bell controlled the cost of 
switch-board use, many small companies raised consumer prices drastically in order to 
maintain profitability and secure sufficient finances for company survival.  Local 
governments responded by regulating what small companies could charge for telephone 
services (Sterling et al. 2006).   
During the First World War, the federal government assumed control over parts 
of communications service, but relinquished its involvement in 1919.  The Postmaster 
General and Navy officials convinced Congress that only public ownership could ensure 
low prices of telecommunications services.  Prior to 1921, Congress allowed 
telecommunications companies, primarily American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) 
and Bell, to pursue market acquisitions and consolidation (Sterling et al. 2006).  
However, because only AT&T and Bell were in a position to take advantage of this 
opportunity, the Willis-Graham Act of 1921 ended the early competitive era.        
 The significance of the Willis-Graham Act of 1921 is that it provided a transition 
whereby the government accepted the idea that monopoly, not competition, was the 
proper structure for the telecommunications industry.  Additionally, the Act redefined 
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telecommunications to be a public utility (Sterling et al. 2006).  Government officials 
and economists viewed competition in the nation-wide service as wasteful of natural 
resources and AT&T was the only telephone operator not banned from providing local 
and long distance services (Aufderheide 1999).  The Federal Communication 
Commission (FCC) identified the telecommunications industry as a natural monopoly, 
which implied that telecommunications services were more effective and efficient when 
offered by only one company (Sterling et al. 2006).     
 This monopolized service was also heavily regulated by federal and state 
governments.  Laws and regulations during the 1920s and 1930s were concerned with 
quality of service and rate of return, not corporate governance and dishonesty.  
Regulatory bureaucracies’ primary focus was ensuring that AT&T offered an affordable-
quality service under its protected status as a monopoly (Aufderheide 1999).  The rate-
of-return regulation limited what AT&T could charge consumers for its services while 
ensuring the prices charged were sufficient to cover the company’s expenses.           
The FCC and federal government were forced to adapt communication policies 
and regulations to the social and professional lifestyles of the public, regardless of 
marketplace involvement (Aufderheide 1999).  For nearly 40 years the FCC and 
communications policy underwent very few changes.  The monopolized industry opened 
competition to long distance and international calling and telephone equipment in the 
early 1970s.  Competition created painful pricing challenges because local and long 
distance cost had been politically, instead of economically, established between the FCC 
and AT&T prior to the 1970s.  Aside from the pricing dilemma, the switch from a 
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monopoly to a competitive long distance market was relatively smooth and 
unproblematic.  There were other times of budding competition but wartime 
interruptions, partisan changes, and other factors secured AT&T’s position as a market 
leader (Sterling et al. 2006).  Other policy changes made to the telecommunications 
industry were minor and oriented toward upholding the liberties given by the first 
amendment in the U.S. Constitution (Aufderheide 1999).   
In 1985 domestic telecommunication companies sustained significant financial 
losses due to inconsistencies in accounting and billing procedures related to long 
distance and international calls.  When the FCC was informed of these financial losses, it 
began negotiating with foreign telecommunication companies and facilitating long 
distance and international calling competition among domestic and foreign companies.  
Telecommunications monopolies in Britain and France responded by instituting 
privatization or liberalization in the mid-1980s (Sterling et al. 2006).  Through the late 
1980s, continual increases occurred in domestic telecommunications long distance 
competition and in discussions by regulators of reinstituting widespread competition in 
the telecommunications industry.  Industry-government negotiations started the process 
of deregulation in 1985.   
In the early 1990s, telecommunications innovation and expansion was becoming 
unavoidable.  A broadly accessible communication service was evolving into what we 
now know as the internet and the World Wide Web.  Initially, governmental regulations 
on industrial expansion impeded communications infrastructural development 
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(Aufderheide 1999; Sterling et al. 2006).  In response, this industrial sector mobilized 
politically in order to promote expansion of services and profit making. 
3.2 Changes in Corporations’ Political Embeddedness: The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 
 In the early 1990s, incompatibilities emerged between the technical and 
economic realities of a digital industry and among regulatory laws that were based on 
analog technology (Horwitz 1989; Sterling et al.. 2006).  Corporate managers in large 
telecommunications companies maintained that regulatory requirements prevented them 
from expanding product lines and services and lobbied to change the political-legal 
arrangements in which the telecommunications industry was embedded.  
In response, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which 
transformed a largely monopolistic industry controlled by government regulation to an 
industry characterized by market competition and economic growth (Aufderheide 1999; 
Malik 2003; Sterling et al. 2006).  The stated purpose of the Act was to “create a 
regulatory platform that would permit broad competition among different kinds of 
telecommunication service providers, encourage innovation, and recognize rapid 
technological change” while preserving the strength and vitality of an already 
established industrial sector (Aufderheide 1999: 8).  In addition, the legislation was 
designed to create and encourage telecommunication competition on local scenes as well 
as in the stock market (Sterling et al. 2006).   
  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 enabled market expansion and 
competition in the industry while new technologies, such as the internet and World Wide 
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Web, created excitement and anticipation among executives and investors (Malik 2003).  
The Act brought many new small businesses into competition which increased demand 
for telecommunications hardware and services.  Smaller retail companies sold the 
services of larger telecommunications corporations which allowed for expansion of the 
large corporations.  The public demand in the late 1990s further enabled large companies 
to grow through mergers, acquisitions, and hostile takeovers (Malik 2003).   
After the Act was passed by the Congress, corporate managers pushed company 
expansion and offered investment opportunities to new investors and company 
employees (Jeter 2003).  With the enactment of the legislation, initial public offerings 
(IPO’s) were pursued at a record-setting pace by stock brokers, bankers, and Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) inside and outside of the telecommunications industry (Malik 
2003).   
This legislation was followed by record profits in the telecommunications 
industry.  In addition, the market value of multiple companies sky-rocketed.  Twenty-
five year old billionaires were common at international telecommunications conferences 
(Malik 2003).  Executives such as Bernard Ebbers of WorldCom and John Sidgemore of 
UUNet increased the industry’s market performance by over-stating levels of internet 
use, which stimulated further expansion by most telecommunication companies (Malik 
2003).  Ebbers and Sidgemore along with many other executives took every opportunity 
to exaggerate internet usage stating that “internet use was doubling every 100 days” 
(Malik 2003: xiv).  The result was investors’ massive buying of stock in various 
telecommunications companies and an increase in the production of communication 
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hardware.  In one quarter of 1997, WorldCom’s stock market value increased by 66 
percent (Jeter 2003).  Ebbers, Sidgemore, and other executives successfully created the 
great telecommunications myth - a perception of an endless demand for bandwidth.  
While Ebbers and Sidgemore created the myth, Wall Street analysts, notably Jack 
Grubman, successfully sold the myth to investors. Executives continued to profit from 
rising market values well into the decline of the industry. 
The illusion of telecommunications growth was further emphasized through 
“flashing.”  “Flashing” was a strategy used by telecommunications executives and sales 
managers (most popularly used within Qwest) which exaggerated the prices of sales 
within the corporation (Malik 2003).  In press conferences, sales managers would 
casually announce or “flash” a $30,000 sale for $275,000.  “Flashing” kept investors 
interested, although misinformed, in rapid growth as companies like Qwest scrambled to 
increase profits in any way possible.   
The fiber-optics and internet boom and the subsequent market collapse of the 
telecommunications industry were results of opportunistic executives using insider 
information to bilk private investors (Malik 2003).  During inflation of the internet and 
the fiber-optics bubble, executive managers purposely withheld vital financial 
information (i.e., value of company debt) and exaggerated the telecommunication 
industry’s rate of expansion.  As a result, investors were misinformed or not informed 
about the dubious soundness of the telecommunications market (Malik 2003).  
Asymmetric information and executive autonomy created one-sided beneficial 
relationships between executives and investors.  Although investors were confused by 
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new technologies, such as broadband, they continued to trust in Wall-Street analysts and 
executives and became more excited about industry expansion.  The revolution of new 
technological products stirred public confidence.   
An uninformed and inexperienced investing public was drawn into the 
telecommunications market that was made accessible by deregulation policies and initial 
public offerings (Aufderheide 1999).  Regulatory bureaucracies were not sufficiently 
prepared for the rapid growth of telecommunications companies resulting in a lack of 
regulatory oversight (Aufderheide 1999).  These historical conditions created 
opportunities for executives to take advantage of new technology, information 
asymmetries, market exuberance, and limited regulation to pursue their profit-making 
agendas with limited oversight or governmental interference.   
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4. HYPOTHESES 
 Researchers have been studying organizational crime for nearly a century 
(Sutherland 1940; Lane 1953).  During this time, they have offered multiple 
explanations of corporate crime.  An important sociological contribution toward 
understanding white-collar crime has been explanations of how differential social 
structures create dependencies, incentives, and opportunities to participate in financial 
malfeasance (Clinard and Yeager 1980; Tillman 2009; Prechel and Morris 2010).  My 
thesis will build on Prechel and Morris’ (2010) research by incorporating individual-
level variables with corporate characteristics.  My objective is to augment and further 
explanations of financial malfeasance.    
 In this study, I use U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) litigations 
against corporate financial wrongdoing as the dependent variable.  The SEC is a federal 
regulatory bureaucracy primarily responsible for enforcing federal securities laws and 
regulating the securities industry.  Its mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation” (Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2011). By focusing on SEC litigation I narrow the broad definition of 
corporate crime.  Companies report financial data to the SEC by financial statements.  If 
the SEC determines there are discrepancies or suspects misrepresentation in the data, 
litigation is filed against the company.  The SEC may also investigate a company’s 
financial records if they suspect illegal or unethical action.  After Global Crossings went 
bankrupt in January 2002, the media began to scrutinize other large telecommunications 
companies.  When the media began questioning executives at WorldCom, they were 
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informed that the SEC was already examining their financial statements.  Legal action 
and financial investigation from the SEC followed, which resulted in various fines and 
disgorgements, prison sentences, and other penalties on the individuals held responsible.  
Prevalence of SEC litigation is a reliable and efficient indicator of financial malfeasance.   
I selected the telecommunications industry to study because: (1) it has led the 
development of technological innovations and the transition into the information age 
since the 1990s, (2) the industry changed substantially due to changing governmental 
legislation, (3) in 2002, Fortune Magazine stated “the fall of telecom ranks as the biggest 
wreck in corporate history,” and (4) previous research has shown that industry-specific 
effects of financial malfeasance were statistically significant in the telecommunications 
industry (Prechel and Morris 2010). I test seven hypotheses based on organizational-
political embeddedness theory, as it includes historical developments within the 
telecommunication industry.   
4.1 Opportunities Hypothesis: The Multilayer-Subsidiary Form 
 In the 1980s the federal government passed legislation that allowed a change 
from the multi-divisional corporate form (i.e., various divisions are legally connected to 
one company) to the multilayer-subsidiary form (i.e., companies are legally independent 
from the parent company).  This form created opportunities for companies to 
misrepresent financial data because the Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed a parent 
company to make internal capital transfers between its subsidiaries (i.e., companies 
owned by the parent company) and the parent company (Boies and Prechel 2002; 
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Prechel and Morris 2010). This allowed the parent company to report revenue that might 
have been actually debt. 
 Boards of directors are charged with a variety of duties (i.e., monitor executive 
performance, ensure corporate growth, protect shareholder’s interest, etc.) (Monks and 
Minow 2004).  One of the most important roles of the board is the regulation and 
oversight of executive and corporate action (Zahra and Pearce 1989).  However, the 
efficacy and relevance of a board of directors’ governance has been scrutinized for over 
a century (Dwight 1907).  Some researchers have even suggested that governance 
provided by boards of directors has been so poor in recent decades that corporations are 
in need of a different oversight structure (Mak 2009).   
Early in the twentieth century, corporations in select states were permitted to 
change from a multi-divisional form to a holdings company form, which resembles the 
multilayer-subsidiary form outlined above (Prechel 2000).  As corporate structure has 
changed, boards of directors have failed to adequately govern company action (Cohan 
2002).  The decentralized nature of the American corporate structure isolates the board 
of directors and filters information as it travels to the board room (Dwight 1907; 
Tashakori and Boulton 1983; Zahra and Pearce 1989; Cohan 2002).  Mak (2009) states 
that as businesses expand into various sectors and industries, it becomes nearly 
impossible for boards of directors to fully comprehend and govern its actions.  In the late 
1990s the telecommunications corporations (i.e., Qwest, WorldCom, etc.) grew rapidly 
through mergers and acquisitions.  With the continual increase in corporate size during 
those years, boards of directors experienced significant difficulties in governing the 
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actions of executives and the corporation as a whole.  As a result, executives were able 
to make important financial decisions quickly without the board of directors being fully 
informed of the extent of the decision.   
 The multilayer-subsidiary form allows executives to bridge organizational gaps 
using information asymmetries to distort their companies’ financial.  
Telecommunications executives hid questionable financial transactions from the 
investing public and oversight agencies, and complex corporate structures alienated the 
board of directors from executive action.  As the number of subsidiaries expands the 
corporate structure and increases corporate complexity.  The more complex the 
corporation the easier it is for corporate executives to hide questionable financial 
transactions (Prechel and Morris 2010).    
            The hypothesis states: 
 : In the telecommunications industry, companies with more subsidiaries have 
a higher likelihood of receiving SEC litigation than corporations with fewer 
subsidiaries. 
4.2 Corporate Growth Hypothesis 
Profit maximization is a necessary goal for all companies’ survival.  However, 
other goals (i.e., corporate expansion) may take precedence over profit maximization 
depending on external constraints and varying historical circumstances.  When profits 
are sufficient to satisfy expectations of shareholders, executives, and other prominent 
corporate individuals, a company may shift its main focus to acquisitions, increasing 
market share, or other forms of growth.  A shift from profit maximization to company 
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expansion would be equally, if not additionally beneficial, to executive managers 
resulting in a taller managerial hierarchy, additional capital flow, bonuses and 
promotions among other company and individual benefits (Clinard and Yeager 1980).   
Telecommunications companies grew significantly in the mid-1990s, announcing 
expansions costing up to $300 million for individual companies (Malik 2003).  Rapid 
corporate growth has been associated with the commission of corporate crime (Clinard 
and Yeager 1980; Tillman and Pontell 1995; Prechel and Morris 2010).  Evidence of this 
is seen in WorldCom, Qwest and other large telecommunications companies in the late-
1990s (Malik 2003).  When corporations or organizations expand rapidly, their 
executives and managers’ actions exceed the capacity of regulatory agencies to 
adequately monitor their activities (Tillman and Pontell 1995).  Additionally, Clinard 
and Yeager (1980) suggest further that the size of a corporation increases the likelihood 
of financial malfeasance because taller managerial hierarchies in large corporations 
distance executive managers from illegal action giving them plausible deniability.  Large 
telecommunications companies were not sufficiently regulated in the mid-1990s due to 
deregulatory acts and technological innovation.  Corporate confusion resulted from lack 
of clarity about legalities and regulatory policies surrounding emerging technology.  The 
industry required the attention of government regulatory officials, especially if ethical 
behavior was expected or assumed (Aufderheide 1999).   
             The hypotheses state: 
   :   A positive relationship exists between a company’s change in asset value 
and the likelihood that they will receive SEC litigation. 
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 : A positive relationship exists between the size, measured in total assets, of 
telecommunications companies and the likelihood that they will receive SEC litigation. 
4.3 Incentives: Executive Compensation Hypotheses 
The majority of research conducted on executive compensation attempts to 
explain relationships and discrepancies between the amount executives earn and prior 
years of company performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Boyer 2010).  My thesis 
incorporates executive compensation variables, along with previously tested causal 
factors of organizational crime, in an attempt to identify relationships between executive 
compensation and organizational crime. 
Financial incentives have increased rapidly over the past few decades.  They 
have jumped from approximately 100 times the average worker’s pay in 1990 to 
between 350 and 570 times currently in the United States (Harris and Bromiley 2007).  
For this reason, CEO’s annual incomes have been scrutinized by all forms of media 
since the early 1990s.  Executives were criticized by economists, politicians, and 
shareholders because no explanation was given as to why a CEOs annual income 
increased so much when profits and shareholder value remained static or decreased from 
the previous years (Monks and Minow 2004).  For example, Monks and Minow (2004) 
state that the annual income of  Rand Araskog, CEO of International Telephone & 
Telegraph (ITT), increased 103 percent in 1991 as shareholders watched the company’s 
market value decrease by 18 percent.   
In the mid-2000s, CEOs were criticized for being awarded large bonuses with 
government bailout monies or taxpayer dollars.  Endthebailouts.com states that 86 
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percent of the $125 billion dollars given to investment banks in 2008 was used for 
executive bonuses (Green 2008).  These controversial actions by executives cast doubt to 
the legal and ethical appropriateness of executive behavior.  However, contrary to the 
popular focus given by the media, i.e., how much a CEO is paid, diverts attention from 
the real problem of executive compensation – how executives are paid (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990).   
While in some corporations executive salaries and bonuses are substantial, the 
majority of cash in an executive compensation package comes from bonuses, 
stockholdings, and stock options (Jensen and Murphy 1990).  The value of executive 
stock can be valued up to nearly 20 times the base salary (Harris and Bromiley 2007).  
Towers Perrin, a financial consulting company, found that the average value of stock 
options awarded to CEOs had doubled between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s (Monks 
and Minow 2004).  More than 71 percent of firms offer stock options as a part of the 
compensation packages in an attempt to (1) align the goal of profit maximization 
between the executives and the shareholders, (2) encourage executives to behave more 
like owners, and (3) strengthen the link between pay and performance (Monks and 
Minow 2004).  Increased profits, then, result in increased cash from stockholdings and 
options for shareholders and executives.    
Executives maximize profits from stock options only if market value of their 
company is increased before the option is exercised.  When executive managers are 
unable to maximize market value and company profits, the value of the compensation 
package and their job security is at risk.  When executives fail to maximize corporate 
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profits, shareholders may want to change executives’ compensation plan so that it will 
vary respectively with the company’s market performance (Monks and Minow 2004).  
However, the growing trend of “mega-grants” has practically eliminated return risk and 
uncertainty for executives.  A mega-grant is any equity grant that exceeds 500,000 stock 
options (Barr 2009).  Mega-grants are becoming more popular in large corporations 
while economists view them as having conflicting results in regard to executive 
performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990).  Additionally, research results identifying a 
relationship between mega-grants and financial malfeasance are insufficient.   
While the award of a large amount of shares nearly guarantees a cash return to 
executives, it also encourages as a more direct incentive the increase of market value 
(Jensen and Murphy 1990; Monks and Minow 2004; Harris and Bromiley 2007).  A 
compensation analysis by Jensen and Murphy (1990) states that CEO salary is affected 
minimally by company growth and increased market value.   Their analysis of 250 
executive compensation packages yields that for every $1,000 change in shareholder 
value a CEO should expect to receive a 3.3 cent change in salary and bonus.  However, 
for the same increase in corporate market value an executive will see, on average, a 14.4 
cent change in exercised stockholdings.  To illustrate, according to Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) if a CEO’s annual salary is two-million dollars, his or her salary will increase 
$66,000 (2,000,000*.033), for every $1,000 increase the corporation’s in market value.  
At the same time, a share worth $50 can be expected to increase to $57.20 dollars 
(50*.144) with the same $1,000 increase in market value. Subsequently, a CEO who 
owns 500,000 shares would expect a $3,600,000 increase (500,000*7.20) in the value of 
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the exercised shares, excluding options.  Therefore, I focus on stock options because the 
change in payout to executives is significantly more than the change in salary and bonus 
value.   
The increase in stockholdings may create enough CEO incentive to maximize 
corporate profits.  When executives are awarded with large amounts of stock and stock 
options, the return is more directly affected by their actions and performance.  Therefore, 
a positive relationship exists between the number of shares owned and rate of cash 
return, thus more directly aligning the profit maximization goals of executives and 
shareholders (Monks and Minow 2004).  The mega-grant, then, ensures that an increase 
in corporate value will largely profit executives.     
As discussed above, large portions of an executive managers’ compensation 
package lie in a profit-shared plan.  This plan directly associates executive compensation 
with the overall financial progress and market value of the corporation.  By connecting 
executive pay to market stock value growth an incentive is created to raise or inflate the 
overall worth of the company.  Such inflation results in higher dividends to shareholders 
and shareholding executives.  While there are legitimate means to attain market growth, 
financial constraints are felt by executives in times of economic uncertainty.  These 
constraints create an incentive to illegitimately inflate a corporation’s financial data for 
subsequent personal financial gain (Varian 2002).    
The hypothesis states: 
25 
 
 
  A positive relationship exists between the value in dollars of options 
exercised by telecommunication executives and the likelihood of receiving SEC 
litigation.   
Recent research suggests a positive relationship exists between strategies used to 
increase share value and corporate malfeasance (Prechel and Morris 2010).  When 
legitimate action to increase share value does not result in a desired financial outcome, 
executive managers might use unethical and/or illegal action.  “Failure to increase 
shareholder value may cause investors to divest from the company, withhold future 
investments, and/or attempt to replace top management” (Prechel and Morris 2010: 333).  
Although shareholders may not be able to maximize corporate profits, executives, on the 
other hand, can utilize multiple strategies to raise market value in an attempt to increase 
share profit to shareholders.    
            The hypothesis states: 
  A negative relationship exists between earnings per share and the likelihood 
of a telecommunications company receiving SEC litigation. 
4.4 Political Involvement Hypothesis 
Political Action Committees (PAC’s) have become increasingly important in 
corporate and political policy.  The involvement of corporate monies in governmental 
policy enactment and enforcement increases corporate opportunities to engage in 
buffering: strategies used to reduce the effects of political-legal arrangements within 
corporations (Prechel and Morris 2010).  PAC’s allow corporations to access 
government officials who are influenced to push deregulatory policies and weaken 
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oversight bureaucracies, among other actions that would benefit a company or industry.  
A lack of oversight allows a company to act autonomously and create opportunities for 
financial malfeasance.   
            The hypothesis states: 
: A positive association exists between the amount of monies 
telecommunications companies contribute to PACs and the likelihood of receiving SEC 
litigation. 
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Sample 
The data set includes the largest publically traded U.S. telecommunications 
companies as identified in Fortune magazine’s list of 500 largest U.S. publicly traded 
parent companies in 2002.  In this study, cases are company-years.  Thus, for each 
company, all data are separated in annual increments for the duration of the time period 
of study.  The dataset includes twenty-one companies.  The time period of study begins 
in 1995 and ends in 2004 resulting in 115 company-years.  The choice of time period 
also gives telecommunications management sufficient time to respond to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2001.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires CEOs and CFOs to sign financial 
statements personally attesting to the validity and accuracy of a company’s financial 
statements’ contents.  The Act was passed after public demand for governmental 
oversight increased after a series of corporate scandals, many of which occurred in the 
telecommunications industry.  The Act was an attempt to ensure the financial 
accountability and transparency of corporations (Bing 2007).  Financial transparency 
means the full disclosure of financial action must be made on corporate balance sheets.  
Transparency is achieved when corporations adhere to the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).  Sarbanes-Oxley also created incentives for executive 
managers to adhere to financial regulations because the penalties for knowingly or 
willfully submitting falsified statements were increased up to 20 years of imprisonment 
with the possibilities of a fine as well (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002).  Additionally, if a 
company is required to restate its financial data due to misconduct, its executives may be 
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forced to give up bonuses or profits gained from selling their shares.  These penalties 
limit the risk of misreporting because they provide sufficient motivation to restate any 
previous misleading financial data.   
The year 2001 is used as the sample selection year because corporations are 
likely to have altered their behavior after Sarbanes-Oxley was passed.  Also, several 
corporations that engaged in financial malfeasance (e.g., Enron, Tyco and WorldCom) 
were eliminated from the Fortune 500 after that year (Prechel and Morris 2010).  
Nevertheless, several corporations were excluded from Fortune’s list because they are 
partnerships, private companies, or subsidiaries of foreign companies.  Partnerships and 
privately owned companies were excluded because they are not required to adhere to the 
same financial disclosure requirements as publicly traded companies.  Foreign 
corporations’ subsidiaries were excluded because the holding or parent company must 
adhere to the financial requirements and political-legal arrangements in the varying 
countries in which they are located.  Companies who had merged were identified by the 
company which took managerial control, while companies which went private were 
excluded from the dataset.   
5.2 SEC Litigation: A Dependent Variable 
I focus on financial accuracy and transparency through SEC litigations as the 
dependent variable.  By using SEC litigation as a dependent variable I am able to focus 
specifically on financial misconduct.  Publically traded companies are required to submit 
financial data annually to the SEC.  These data are also made available to investors so 
they may make informed investment decisions of the overall financial health and 
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strength of the company (Tillman 2009).  If those financial data are purposefully 
inaccurate or other unethical relationships have benefited the company and are not 
disclosed, the SEC will take legal action, known as litigation.   
SEC litigation is a dummy variable measuring whether or not a corporation 
received litigation in a given year.  It is coded: “1” if the company did receive litigation 
and “0” if not.  The data of whether or not the company received SEC litigation data 
were obtained by Prechel and Morris (2010) from SEC documentation.  I use a dummy 
of SEC litigations instead of total number of litigations because researchers have shown 
that the first malfeasance event is the most important (Clinard and Yeager 1980).  This 
does not assume, however, that all first incidences of malfeasance are equal in severity.   
5.3 Independent Variables 
The corporate structure variable measures how many companies are nested in the 
second level of the multi-layer subsidiary form (i.e., structured with the parent company 
acting as primary share holder financial operator of legally separate subsidiary 
companies nested within the parent company).  I use these data instead of a dummy 
variable of corporate structure because 98 percent of the telecommunications companies 
were structured in the multilayer-subsidiary form in the time period of study.  Using a 
dummy variable, therefore, results in perfect association in the analysis.  These data 
were collected from Dun & Bradstreet (1995 to 2004), the SEC, and various 
corporations’ web sites (Prechel and Morris 2010). 
Measures of corporate financial characteristics between the years 1995 and 2004 
were collected by Prechel and Morris (2010) from the Compustat dataset.   I measure 
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change in asset value change as total assets from the previous year and measure the 
corporation’s size as the natural log of the company’s total assets.   
   Earnings per share is measured before expenses for extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations are deducted.  Executive compensation is measured as the value, 
in U.S. dollars, of the exercised shares awarded to a CEO.  The value is reported by 
multiplying the number of exercised options by the share price at the end of a calendar 
year.   
I measure political activity by the amount of U.S. dollars parent companies and 
their subsidiaries contributed to political action committees between 1995 and 2004, in 
thousands of dollars.  These data were collected by the firm Open Secrets, which 
compiles data acquired from the Federal Election Commission 
I use additional variables which have been identified as causal indicators of 
organizational crime as control variables in my study.  Previous research shows a 
company’s age, measured in years, has been correlated with corporate crime (Tillman 
and Pontell 1995; Crutchely et al. 2007) and is used as a control variable.  These data are 
available from Dun and Bradstreet and corporate websites.  Additionally, capital 
dependence on banks affects corporate behavior (Prechel 2000).  Therefore, rate of 
return on equity, or profits, is measured in percent rate of return and was obtained from 
the Compustat database.   
5.4 Estimation 
 For the quantitative analysis, I use a logit model for discrete-time event history 
analysis.  An events-history analysis allows me to incorporate time sensitive variables 
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(company-year units) to account for the probability of event occurrence1 (Zhou and Hou 
1999).  The logit analysis is appropriate because the dependent variable, SEC litigation, 
is a binary variable.  The multivariate logit regression allows me to determine the 
probability that a company with particular characteristics or underlying conditions would 
have received SEC litigation.   I used the VIF command in Stata, to identify issues with 
multi-colinearity. 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed explanation of the logit model for discrete-time event history analysis, see Zhou and 
Hou  (1999). 
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6. FINDINGS 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  Because I analyze a panel 
dataset, the unit of analysis is a company-year.  In the 115 company-years, various 
companies received SEC litigation in 11 percent on the company-years.  Additionally, 
six of the twenty-one of the companies involved received SEC litigation, some received 
up 11 litigations in one year.  Because the telecommunications companies in the sample 
come from Fortune’s list of the 500 largest companies, the potential impact of these 
litigations is substantial for the investing public. 
Ninety-two percent of the companies in the time period of this study are 
structured in the multilayer-subsidiary form and the average number of second-level 
subsidiary companies is 38.  The mean rate of total asset growth is -6.01 percent and the 
log-value of total assets is 9.81.  The average value of exercised stock options is 
$6,830,114.  The mean earnings per share is $.42 and the mean contribution to political 
action committees is $419,030.  Finally, the mean age of the companies is 32.7 years and 
the mean return on equity is -$38.20. 
 Table 2 presents the multivariate findings.  Coefficients in Table 2 represent the 
likelihood that an SEC litigation would occur.  I also present several coefficients as the  
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percent change in the odds ratio, which is calculated by subtracting 1 from the antilog (e 
to the power) of the logit coefficient multiplied by 100 (Ω-1*100).   
 Model 1 examines seven variables regarding corporate structure and financial 
characteristics.  There are two important findings in this model.  The first is that the 
value of a company’s total assets increases the likelihood that a company would receive 
SEC litigation.  For every one unit increase in the natural log of total assets, the 
likelihood of that company receiving SEC litigation increases by 355 percent 
[( .  Larger companies are more likely to engage in risky capital 
activity because they have the power and financial resources to survive the potential 
economic loss (Morris 2005).  Further, risky financial investments carry the probability 
of financial loss and increase the likelihood of participating in illegal or unethical 
transactions.  This finding supports existing literature on size as a causal indicator of 
financial malfeasance, and supports Hypothesis 3. 
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The second important finding is the coefficient of the earnings per share variable.  
The concept of shareholder value is based on the assumption that when executives are 
compensated in profit-shared plans (i.e., stock options), an incentive is created to act in 
the interest of the shareholders or owners and not engage in unethical or illegal behavior.  
In agreement with the theory, I hypothesized that the coefficient of earnings per share 
would be negatively correlated with SEC litigation and statistically significant.  I found,  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Measurements between 1995 and 2004 
 Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variable 
      SEC Litigation 11% 
 Corporate Structure 
      Number of Level-two Subsidiaries 38.010 54.340 
Corporate Growth 
      Total Asset Growth  -6.010 229.490 
    Total Assets (ln) 9.810 1.294 
    Earnings Per Share $0.42 $7.15 
Executive compensation 
      Value of Options exercised by CEO $6,830.11 $19,772.23 
Political Involvement 
      PAC Contributions (in thousands) $419.03 $457.46 
Control Variables 
      Age of Company 32.773 31.418 
    Return on Equity -$38.20 $509.44 
   N of 21 Companies 
  N of 115 Telecommunications Company-Years     
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 Table 2.  Coefficients and Standard Errors for Predictors of 
Securities and Exchange Commission Litigation 
Variables Model 1 
  Intercept -18.472** 
 
(-7.516) 
  Corporate Characteristics 
     Number of level-two Subsidiaries -0.004 
 
(.013) 
      Total Asset Growth .003 
 
(.003) 
      Total Assets 1.393* 
 
(.709) 
  Financial Characteristics 
     Earnings Per Share -0.113 
 
(.153) 
  
  Control Variables 
     Company Age -0.009 
 
(.035) 
      Return on Equity 0.018 
 
(0.039) 
  N of Companies 21 
N of Company Years 115 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 0.381 
Goodness of Fit Ratio 6.39 
*p < .05; **p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
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however, earnings per share, although negatively correlated, is not statistically 
significant on whether or not the company received SEC litigation.  In the 
telecommunications industry, earnings per share does not influence the likelihood of 
participating in illegal or unethical activity.  This result does not support Hypothesis 5. 
The remaining results in Table 2 indicate that the multilayer-subsidiary form and 
total growth in assets are not significant indicators of whether or not a 
telecommunications company received SEC litigation during the time period of study.  
These results do not support Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
When data on executive compensation and PAC contributions are added into the 
multivariate analysis presented in Table 2, the number of company-years declines from 
115 to 61.  I examined the data and discovered that there is a substantial amount of 
missing data on the executive compensation variable.2  When I remove the executive 
compensation variable and let the PAC contributions variable remain in the equation, the 
number of company-years falls below 100, which jeopardizes the accuracy of the model.  
The low number of company-years does not yield reliable findings for these two 
variables when they are included in the multivariate analysis.  Consequently, I conduct 
two one-tailed t-test analyses to determine whether or not these data are significant 
indicators of receiving SEC litigation.  These data are presented in Tables 3 and 4.   
 
 
                                                 
2 The majority of missing data belongs to corporations who were involved in SEC litigation and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) proceedings (i.e., WorldCom, Adelphia, Sprint, Qwest, etc.).  I contacted the 
SEC and was informed that if there are still pending arrangements with the DOJ these data would not have 
been made available to the public.    
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Table 3.  T-test for Value of Stock Options on SEC litigation 
 
t-score t-critical (one-tail; p < .05) 
 
  
Value of Exercised Stock Options 1.06 1.66 
   
 Means  
   Received Litigation 13,459.21  
   No litigation received  6,114.35  
   Difference in Means -7,314.86  
 
 
 Degrees of Freedom 94   
* p < .05 (One-tail test) 
   
 
The results indicate whether or not the value of exercise stock options and PAC 
contributions are significantly different between those companies which received SEC 
litigation and those that did not.  Statistically significant differences would justify the 
collection of these data unreported by other companies.   
Table 3 indicates that the t-score of 1.06 for the value of exercised stock offerings 
does exceed critical t-value area, 1.66, with 94 degrees of freedom.  The respective 
difference of means of the companies that did and did not receive SEC litigation are not 
significant.  These data do not support Hypothesis 4.  
Table 4 indicates that the amount of PAC contributions is not a significant 
indicator of the likelihood that a telecommunications company received SEC litigation 
during the time period of study.  The t-score of .73 does not exceed the critical t-value of 
1.65 with 128 degrees of freedom. Although the data for this variable do not result in  
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  Table 4.  T-test for PAC Contribution on SEC Litigation 
 
t-score t-critical (one-tail; p < .05) 
   PAC Total Contributions 0.731 1.66 
   
 Means  
   Received Litigation  494,780.10  
   No litigation received  407,638.70  
   Difference in Means -87,141.40 
  
  Degrees of Freedom 128   
* p < .05 (One-tail test) 
   
 
statistical significance among telecommunications companies between 1995 and 2004, it 
is interesting to note that every company contributed PAC monies in every year of the 
study period.  These data do not support Hypothesis 6. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The statistical analysis yields mixed findings in the research of financial 
malfeasance.  The telecommunication industry underwent substantial change in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 revolutionized the 
structure of the industry and had substantial effects on the relationships within 
telecommunications and multiple other industries (Malik 2003).  The data analyzed in 
this thesis are not comprehensive of the affects produced by the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 on the U.S. economy.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed 
executive managers to act with limited regulatory oversight which enabled companies to 
grow rapidly and executives to create financial contracts through asymmetric 
information (Aufderheide 1999; Malik 2003).  Because of the rapid increase of stock 
prices in 1998 and 1999, executives falsely reported growing revenues to match rising 
market values.  The complexity of the post-Act telecommunications industry enabled 
executives to falsify financial data with little regulatory oversight.   
Organizational-political embeddedness theory suggests that historical conditions 
influence executive action.  Industry-wide problems in telecommunications existed 
between 1996 and 2003. Reliable and valid conclusions about this industry require 
identifying how historical conditions influenced corporate behavior.  As a result of 
legislation changes, multiple companies declared bankruptcy, various malfeasant 
activities occurred, many of which resulted in prison sentences, fines, and removal of 
executive officers in several telecommunications companies (Jeter 2003; Malik 2003).   
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 offers important insight for politicians 
pushing for deregulation and pro-business policies.  Ultimately, the lack of regulatory 
oversight gave executive managers too much autonomy in an industry fueled by greed 
(Aufderheide 1999).  Some executives were not concerned with increasing shareholder 
value to please investors, but, instead, were concerned with protecting themselves 
anyway they could especially when the industry began to fail (Malik 2003).  The Act 
was supposed to increase public confidence and investment in the industry.  Instead, the 
post-Act unethical and illegal actions of corporate executives weakened investor 
confidence that were made vulnerable to risky financial actions due to asymmetric 
information form telecommunication executives. 
Prechel and Morris’ (2010) argument of corporate structure yields important 
conclusions in the literature of corporate malfeasance.  They demonstrate that companies 
structured in the multilayer-subsidiary form are more likely to engage in financial 
malfeasance.  This finding is very important in my study as 92 percent of 
telecommunications companies are structured in the multi-layer subsidiary form.  
Additionally, my findings differ from Prechel and Morris’ (2010) because their article 
focuses on financial restatements as a dependent variable while I focus on SEC litigation 
as a dependent variable.  I also use a different measure of multilayer-subsidiary form 
because within the telecommunications industry 98 percent of companies involved were 
structured in this form.  Using a dummy variable to identify corporate structure resulted 
in perfect association in the quantitative analysis.    
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The data provided in this thesis are insufficient to yield any statistically 
significant findings of the influence executive compensation might have had on financial 
malfeasance in telecommunications companies between 1995 and 2004.  Due to the 
number of missing cases I am unable to state definitive conclusions that executive 
compensation may or may not be a significant indicator of corporate malfeasance in the 
telecommunications industry.  Efforts to collect these data are being made in extending 
this research in the future.  
Nevertheless, organizational-political embeddedness theory still has usefulness in 
explaining corporate and executive behaviors.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
had significant consequences on the health of the telecommunications industry and 
market.  The theory and the research demonstrate that there were increased levels of 
executive autonomy due to the limited resources and efficacy of regulatory 
bureaucracies.  Whether or not awards in stock options to executives increased the 
likelihood of financial malfeasance within the telecommunications industry between 
1995 and 2004 has yet to be determined with statistical significance.  The executive 
compensation package is very complex and additional study and research is warranted 
before definitive conclusions can be made on how it influences illegal or unethical 
behavior. 
This thesis is a starting point and a call for future research in the 
telecommunications industry and understanding the causes of corporate crime.  While 
significant research has been done examining the effectiveness of the board of directors, 
much of this research has been oriented toward furthering understanding financial 
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growth, not regulating corporate action.  The widespread malfeasance that occurred in 
the early 2000s in corporations like Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco warrants further 
research on the effectiveness of oversight abilities within the board of directors.  
However, the failed oversight of large companies does not rest solely on the board of 
directors.  Governmental bureaucracies have been charged with maintaining fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets for investors.  The efficacy of these bureaucracies must be 
increased in order to protect the investing public.  Laws and regulations calling for 
increased financial transparency within corporations will allow regulators to be more 
effective in their work.  By strengthening oversight agencies (i.e., the SEC) and laws and 
penalties for corporations (i.e., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), corporate managers may 
increase individual and corporate focus on ethical and legal behavior.  Such behavior 
will increase public confidence and promote stable growth within financial markets.   
The continuation of this research project would focus on the efficiency of internal 
and external corporate regulation.  Some studies have examined characteristics of 
executives and focused on greed as a fatal flaw in corporate America (Gray et. al 2005; 
Simon 2008).  However, executives are under significant pressures to maximize profits.  
It is then up to the regulatory organizations (i.e., the SEC and the board of directors) to 
monitor corporate activity.  The efficacy of corporate governance continues to be an 
important area of political and economic research and is necessary to restore economic 
stability and facilitate continuous economic growth.   
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 The funding for the data collection was provided by a National Science 
Foundation collaborative grant to Texas A&M University (SES-0351496) and Trinity 
College (SES-0351423) and Texas A&M University (SES-0456113). 
 
 
44 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Aufderheide, Patricia. 1999. Communications Policy and the Public Interest: The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, edited by T. Glasser and M. Poole. New York: 
The Guilford Press. 
Baker, Wayne E. 1984. "The Social Structure of a National Securities Market." The 
American Journal of Sociology 89:775-811. 
Barr, Alistar. 2009. "Stock-option 'mega-grants' reappear after market slump: CEOs at 
Seagate, SunTrust, Capital One could make millions from awards." Vol. 2010. 
San Francisco, CA: MarketWatch. 
Bing, Kevin. 2007. "Purpose of Sarbanes Oxley Act." in Purpose of Sarbanes Oxley Act: 
EzineArtcles.com. 
Boies, John and Harland Prechel. 2002. "Capital Dependence, Business Political 
Behavior, and Change to the Multilayer Subsidiary Form." Social Problems 
49:301-326. 
Boyer, Robert. 2010. "The Rise of CEO Pay and the Contemporary Social Structure of 
Accumulation in the United States." Pp. 215-238  in Contemporary Capitalism 
and Its Crisis: Social Structure Accumulation Theory for the 21st Century, edited 
by T. McDonough, M. Reich, and D. M. Kotz. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Clinard, Marshal B. and Peter C. Yeager. 1980. Corporate Crime: The First 
Comprehensive Account of Illegal Practices Among America's Top Corporations. 
New York: The Free Press. 
Cohan, John. 2002. ""I Didn't Know" and "I Was Only Doing My Job": Has Corporate 
Governance Careened Out of Control? A Case Study of Enron's Information 
Myopia." Journal of Business Ethics 40:275-99. 
Crutchely, Claire, Marlin Jensen, and Beverly Marshall. 2007. "Climate for Scandal: 
Corporate Environments that Contribute to Accounting Fraud." The Financial 
Review 42:53-73. 
Dwight, Frederick. 1907. "Liability of Corporate Directors." The Yale Law Journal 
17:33-42. 
Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen. 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control." 
Journal of Law and Economics 26:301-325. 
45 
 
 
Gray, Kenneth, Larry Frieder, and Gerorge Clark. 2005. Corporate Scandals: The Many 
Faces of Greed. St. Paul, MN: Paragon House. 
Green, Jason. 2008. "86% of Bailout Money Used for Executive Bonuses." in 
Endthebailouts.com, vol. 2010. 
Greve, Henrich. 1998. "Performance, Aspirations and Risky Organizational Change." 
Administrative Science Quarterly 43:58-86. 
Hamner, W. Clay. 1975. "How to Ruin Motivation with Pay." Compensation Review 
7:17-27. 
Harris, Jared and Philip Bromiley. 2007. "Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of 
Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation." 
Organization Science 18:350-367. 
Holmes, Sarah, Margaret Langford, Orion Welch, and Sandra Welch. 2002. 
"Associations Between Internal Controls And Organizational Citizenship 
Behavior." Journal of Managerial Issues; JMI 14:85. 
Hooks, Karen, Steven Kaplan, and Joseph Schultz. 1994. "Enhancing Communication to 
Assist in Fraud Prevention and Detection" Auditing 13:86-117. 
Horwitz, Robert. 1989. The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of American 
Telecommunications. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Isaac, Larry and Larry Griffin. 1989. "Ahistoricism in Time-Series Analyses of 
Historical Process: Critique, Redirection, and Illustrations From U.S. Labor 
History." American Sociological Review 54:873-890. 
Jensen, Michael and William Meckling. 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 3:305-360. 
Jensen, Michael and Kevin Murphy. 1990. "CEO Incentives--It's Not How Much You 
Pay, But How." Harvard Business Review May-June. 
Jeter, Lynn. 2003. Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom. Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
Lane, Robert E. 1953. "Why Businessmen Violate the Law." Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology, and Police Science 56:25-34.  
Leatherwood, Marya and Lee Spector. 1991. "Enforcements, Inducements, Expected 
Utility and Employee Misconduct." Journal of Management 17:553. 
46 
 
 
Mak, Candice. 2009. "Corporate Structures are Frightening Independent Directors." in 
AsiaLaw, March 2009, p 19. 
Malik, Om. 2003. Broadbandits: Inside the $750 Billion Telecom Heist. Hoboken, MA: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
March, James and Herbert Simon. 1993. Organizations. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 
Publishers. 
Mitchell, Terence, Denise Daniels, Heidi Hopper, Jane George-Falvy, and Gerald Ferris. 
1996. "Perceived Correlates of Illegal Behavior in Organizations." Journal of 
Business Ethics 15:439-455. 
Mizruchi, Mark S. and Linda Brewster Stearns. 1994. "A Longitudinal Study of 
Borrowing by Large American Corporations." Administrative Science Quarterly 
39:118-140. 
Monks, Robert A. G. and Nell Minow. 2004. Corporate Governance. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
Morris, Theresa. 2005. "Banks in Crisis: Public Policy and Bank Mergers in the New 
Economy." Pp. 151-181 in Research in Political Sociology: Politics and the 
Corporation, vol. 14, edited by H. Prechel. Oxford: Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Gerald Salancik. 2003. The External Control of Organizations: A 
Resource Dependence Perspective. Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press. 
Prechel, Harland and John Boies. 1998. "Capital Dependence, Financial Risk, and 
Change from the Multidivisional to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form." 
Sociological Forum 13:321-362. 
Prechel, Harland. 2000. Big business and the State: Historical Transitions and 
Corporate Transformation, 1880s-1990s. Albany, NY: SUNY. 
Prechel, Harland and Theresa Morris. 2010. "The Effects of Organizational and Political 
Structures on Financial Malfeasance in the Largest U.S. Corporations." American 
Sociological Review 75:331-354. 
Russell, Ronald and Scott Finerman. 1995. "Understanding fraud and embezzlement." 
Ohio CPA Journal 54:37-40. 
Schnatterly, Karen. 2003. "Increasing Firm Value through Detection and Prevention of 
White-collar Crime." Strategic Management Journal 24:587-614. 
47 
 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission. 2011. "The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC 
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation." 2011. 
Simon, David R. 2008. Elite Deviance. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc. 
Simpson, Sally S. 1986. "The Decomposition of Antitrust: Testing a Multi-Level, 
Longitudinal Model of Profit-Squeeze." American Sociological Review 51:859-
875. 
Stavros, James. 1998. "The forgotten factor in preventing employee fraud: Employee 
screening." Pennsylvania CPA Journal 69:30 
Sterling, Christopher H., Phyllis W. Bernt, and Martin B. H. Weiss. 2006. Shaping 
American Telecommunications: A History of Technology, Policy, and 
Economics. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Sutherland, Edwin. 1940. "White-Collar Criminality." American Sociological Review 
5:1-12. 
Tashakori, A. and W. Boulton. 1983. "A Look at the Board's Role in Planning." The 
Journal of Business Strategy 3:64-70. 
Tillman, Robert and Henry Pontell. 1995. "Organizations and Fraud in the Savings and 
Loan Industry." Social Forces 73:1439-1463. 
Tillman, Robert. 2009. "Reputations and Corporate Malfeasance: Collusive Networks in 
Financial Statement Fraud." Crime Law and Social Change 51:365-382. 
Varian, Hal. 2002. "Economic Scene; The Real Value of Enron may be as a Worst-Case 
Example of the Need for Clearer Accounting Rules." in New York Times. March 
14, 2002. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications. New York: The Free Press. 
Zahra, Shaker and John Pearce II. 1989. "Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model." Journal of Management 15:291-
334. 
Zhou, Xueguang and Liren Hou. 1999. "Children of the Cultural Revolution: The State 
and the Life Course in the People's Republic of China." American Sociological 
Review 61:12-36. 
 
48 
 
 
VITA 
Bryce Hannibal 
311 Academic Building 
College Station, TX 77843-4351 
Bryce.hannibal@gmail.com 
(208)360-6851 
 
 
Education 
 
B.S. Sociology  2008       Brigham Young University-Idaho 
 
Certificate in Criminology  2008       Brigham Young University-Idaho  
M.S. Sociology  2011                           Texas A&M University 
 
 
 
 
